Abstract-In this paper we propose a decentralized, efficient and selective aggregation (DESA) scheme for secure and privacypreserving communication in AMI. Unlike existing aggregation schemes, DESA uses a multi-recipient system model that is more applicable to liberalized electricity markets. It uses the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt users' consumption data, which are selectively aggregated by local gateways. In this way, the aggregated data of different subsets of users are only delivered to their intended authorized entities. DESA adopts the BLS signature and batch verification methods to reduce computation and communication overheads. Through security analysis and performance evaluation, we show that DESA resists various attacks and preserve users' privacy in an efficient manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is a component of the emerging smart grid (SG) that enables remote communications of metering data [1] . In the automated meter reading, a smart meter (SM) measures its user's consumption data (CD) during a short time slot and sends it to authorised entities. However, uncontrolled access to fine-grained CD may put users' privacy at risk. Entities that access CD may use nonintrusive load monitoring techniques [2] to build individual users' consumption patterns, thus breaching their privacy.
One way to preserve users' privacy is to aggregate users' CD and only make the aggregated CD (ACD) available to entities, assuming that the ACD provides sufficient information to such entities. Also nodes that aggregate the data should not access CD. This can be achieved by using homomorphic encryption techniques [3] that allow nodes to perform a specific linear algebraic operation on ciphertexts, which is equivalent to a different operation conducted on the corresponding plaintexts. Existing aggregation schemes [4] - [8] assume that there is only a single recipient of ACD of all the users. However, in a liberalized electricity market there are multiple entities that have the legitimate right to access ACD of different sets of users. A naïve approach would be to apply one of the existing schemes multiple times, and this will amplify the overheads introduced into AMI. Therefore, there is a need for a new aggregation method more suited to a multi-recipient system model. Also, considering the large number of SMs anticipated, it is desirable to distribute the task of data aggregation across multiple entities in the grid. This distributed approach to data aggregation can also reduce communication overheads in AMI.
In this paper, we propose a novel decentralized, efficient and selective aggregation (DESA) scheme for secure communication in AMI. DESA supports selective aggregation of CD in respective users' suppliers and locations, so that only authorised entities can access the fine-grained ACD necessary for their respective dealings (enhancing users' privacy protection).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: §II discusses the related work. §III provides the preliminaries and §IV the building blocks for the design. The DESA scheme is presented in §V, followed by its security analysis in §VI and performance evaluation in §VII. We draw conclusions in §VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There are a number of proposals on the use of a homomorphic cryptosystem for privacy-preserving data aggregation. For example, Li et al. [4] proposed an in-network aggregation scheme that uses SMs to aggregate users' encrypted CD (ECD) en route for an authorised entity, but their scheme only protects against passive attacks. Deng et al. [5] overcame this by signing each ECD. Li et al. [6] further improved [5] by using the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme that allows a batch verification of signatures. To reduce overheads, Lu et al. [7] proposed a scheme that packs user's multidimensional CD into a single ECD, whereas Ruj et al. [8] proposed a decentralized aggregation method. All of these schemes use a singlerecipient system model (inefficient for liberalized markets) and are vulnerable to passive attacks by authorised entities. If an authorised entity eavesdrops user's ECD prior aggregation, it can recover user's CD. Different from these related works, our scheme uses a multi-recipient system model. 2) Security requirements: (S1) Message authenticity: A recipient should make sure that a message is unaltered, fresh and from the claimed source. (S2) Confidentiality of users' data: Only authorized entities (TSO, DNOs, suppliers) can access users' ACD. (S3) User privacy preservation: Individual users' CD during each time slot, t n , should not be revealed to any entity. (S4) Authorisation: DNOs and suppliers can only access the ACD of the users they operate and supply, respectively. (S5) Availability: DESA should be designed such that it is resilient to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS

A. Bilinear Pairing based Signature Schemes
The BLS short signature [9] has a length half of the size of a DSA signature for a similar level of security. It also allows the construction of an aggregate signature [10] which can be used for a batch verification of messages sent by different users.
Let (G, G T , q, g, e, H) be digital signature system parameters where G and G T are cyclic groups of the same prime order q, g ∈ G is a generator, e : G×G → G T is a bilinear map (e is efficiently computable, e(g, g) = 1 and e(g a , g
1) BLS short signature scheme:
• KeyGen: Select randomly x R ← − Z q and compute y = g x . The secret key is x ∈ Z q . The public key is y ∈ G.
• SigGen: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and secret key x,
• SigVer: Given the public key y, message m, and signature σ, accept if e(g, σ) = e(y, H(m)) holds.
2) Aggregate signature:
• KeyGen, SigGen: Suppose that there are n distinct users. Each user u i (i = {1, . . . , n}), generates its secret key, x i , and public key, y i . Then, u i signs its message m i and obtains its signature, σ i , as described in IV-A1. 
B. Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem [3] has an additive homomorphism property. It is relatively efficient and semantically secure.
• KeyGen: Choose two large prime numbers (
The public key is pk = (n, g) and the private key is sk = (λ, μ).
• Enc: Given a message m ∈ Z n , choose a random number r ∈ Z * n . Compute the ciphertext C = g m . r n mod n 2 .
• Dec: Given the ciphertext C ∈ Z * n 2 , recover the message m = L(C λ mod n 2 ). μ mod n.
1) Additive homomorphism:
Multiplying the ciphertexts of messages results in a ciphertext of the sum of the messages, i.e. 3) SM & GW installation: During installation each SM is equipped with its local BG's and regional DNO's certificates, and each GW -with the certificates of its child SMs/GWs and parent GW. Each BG, bg i , establishes a shared secret key, k bg i , with its child SMs using a standard protocol such as TLS [12] .
B. SM Report Generation
P SM : At the start of a slot t n+1 , each SM, sm i , constructs a message that contains its user's ECD during t n , and sends the message to its local BG, bg i . As shown in Fig. 1, sm 
tn is a time stamp used to uniquely label t n . TS sm i is a local time stamp used to resist replay attacks.
xsm i , to resist active attacks.
6. constructs msg sm i = {M sm i σ sm i } and sends it to bg i . Figure 1 . SM report generation: the P SM processing step.
C. Decentralized and Selective Data Aggregation
Users' ECD are grouped based on their intended recipients and aggregated at various networks' GWs (shown in Fig. 2 ). P DCC−1 : DCC performs operations similar to those in steps 1, 2 and 4 in P BG except that it processes messages from WGs and aggregates the data also in terms of DNOs.
D. Distribution and Data Access
DCC sends selections of AECD to their intended DNOs and suppliers. DNOs recover users' ACD and send the recovered data to TSO and their intended suppliers (shown in Fig. 3 ). P DCC−2 : For each DNO, the DCC constructs a message that contains supplier-based AECD of the users in the region managed by the DNO, signs and sends it to the DNO. P DCC−3 : For each supplier, the DCC constructs a message that contains region-based AECD of the supplier's customers. It then signs and sends the message to the supplier. P DNO : Each DNO verifies the message received from the DCC, recovers the supplier-based ACD in it (satisfy (F1b)) and the random factor embedded in each AECD (as in IV-B2), and sends both items to the respective suppliers. Then, it calculates the total ACD in its region (satisfy (F1a)), and sends it to TSO. P S : Each supplier verifies the message received from DCC and obtains the region-based AECD. It then, upon receiving a message from each DNO, recovers the ACD and random factor and computes the AECD. If the AECD computed is the same as the AECD received, it accepts the ACD (satisfy (F2b)). It then computes the ACD of all its customers (satisfy (F2a)).
P TSO : TSO, upon receiving a message from each DNO, recovers the ACD for each DNO and then calculates the ACD of all the users in the grid (satisfy (F3)).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Message authenticity: Each message in DESA contains a BLS signature which is proven secure under chosen-message Figure 2 . Decentralized and Selective Data Aggregation: the P BG , P NG , P WG and P DCC−1 processing steps. Figure 3 . Distribution and Data Access: the P DCC−2 , P DCC−3 , P DNO , P S and P TSO processing steps.
attack in the random oracle model assuming that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard [9] , [10] . Hence, our scheme guaranties a source authentication, non-repudiation of origin and integrity of each message (satisfy (S1)). Any active attacks on data in transit can be detected and modified data discarded. Also, including a local time stamp in each message ensures that all such messages received are fresh. Confidentiality: In DESA, users' CD are encrypted at SMs using the Paillier cryptosystem, then the ECD are progressively aggregated, and the AECD are delivered to DNOs, where ACD are recovered and selection of them are delivered to TSO and suppliers. As the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks assuming that the Composite Residuosity Class problem is hard [3] , only authorised entities (TSO, DNOs, suppliers) can access users' ACD (satisfy (S2)). Unauthorised internal (GWs, DCC) and external entities eavesdropping messages can only access ECD/AECD, not ACD.
User privacy-preservation: In DESA, DNOs receive only supplier-based AECD of users in their regions, thus the most fine-grained CD a DNO/supplier can access is the ACD of users located in a particular region and supplied by a particular supplier (thousands of users). Even authorized entities (TSO, DNOs, suppliers) are not allowed to access individual users' CD. DESA, unlike others, is also resistant to passive attacks by authorised entities as users' CD are double encrypted (first with the regional DNO's public key, then with the key shared between the SM and its local BG) while in transit between the SM and BG. For the similar reason, if DNOs' secret keys are compromised, DESA can still operate and protect users' privacy as the most fine-grained data adversaries could decrypt is AECD sent by BGs. As long as these AECD contain ACD of sufficient number of users (several dozens), it is hard for adversaries to work out individual users' CD (satisfy (S3)).
Authorisation: In DESA, the use of selective homomorphic encryption ensures that only the entities that need to know a set of users' CD can actually access the ACD of the set, thus making DESA resistant to insider attacks (satisfy (S4)).
Availability: DESA is resistant to DoS attacks as it uses a decentralized approach to data verification/aggregation (early detection and discard of malicious messages, reducing the risk of creating a bottleneck in the system) (satisfy (S5)). 
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In DESA, in each time slot, an SM encrypts its CD once, an SM/GW sends one message, a GW/DCC verifies one message per child entity, and the DCC sends one message to each DNO and supplier. To meet the functional requirements, in the DSF scheme [8] , an SM generates and sends ECD 3 times (to TSO, regional DNO and supplier), a GW sends (2 + N s ) messages (to the TSO, regional DNO and each supplier), a BG verifies 3 message per child SM, an NG/WG/DCC verifies (2 + N s ) messages per child entity, and the DCC sends (1 + N d + N s ) messages (to the TSO, each DNO and each supplier). Considering that computationally expensive operations are exponentiation operations in Z n 2 (o ez ), exponentiation operations in G (o eg ) and pairing operations (o p ), we present the performance comparison of DESA to DSF [8] in Table III .
We ran experiments with pbc [13] and miracl [14] [8] , DESA imposes significantly less costs on each entity. We also ran simulations on Matlab with n d j 1,024-bit, |ID| (|TS|) 32-bit and G 160-bit long [7] . VIII. CONCLUSION We proposed a decentralized, efficient and selective aggregation scheme for use in AMI. The scheme aggregates users' CD in terms of users' suppliers and locations using the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem. In contrast to existing schemes, DESA allows different authorized entities to access ACD of different subsets of users (efficiently applicable to liberalised markets). We also provided security and performance analysis of DESA to demonstrate that it provides high security strength and preserves users' privacy in efficient and scalable manner. Our future work will include an integration of electric vehicles (EVs) and EV aggregator with the SG components of DESA.
